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Field experiments to evaluate the potential for using cash bonus of-
fers to promote early return to work by unemployment insurance (UI)
claimants were conducted in four states between 1984 and 1989.  The
first experiment was initiated by the Illinois Employment Security De-
partment and yielded encouraging results.  This led the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor to include a bonus treatment in the New Jersey reem-
ployment experiment.  Even though evidence from New Jersey was not
strongly positive, to further clarify the findings from Illinois, the Labor
Department sponsored multitreatment experiments in Pennsylvania
and in Washington State.  Results from the latter two experiments were
not supportive of the idea that the reemployment bonus could be a cost-
effective way to promote rapid reemployment, and policy momentum
for the bonus idea faded.
In 1994, the Clinton administration proposed to Congress a federal
reemployment bonus program to be narrowly targeted to dislocated UI
claimants by a worker profiling mechanism based on objective charac-
teristics such as level of education and length of work experience.1 The
previous year, a profiling mechanism of this type had been incorporat-
ed into federal legislation which authorized programs to provide job
search assistance and self-employment allowances.  Clinton’s 1994
reemployment bonus proposal died in Congress, and reemployment
bonuses are not presently available in the United States.  However, any
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future legislative initiative on bonuses would likely include a targeting
mechanism.
By 1995, mechanisms for early identification of UI beneficiaries
who are likely to experience long jobless spells were implemented in
all states.  These procedures are called profiling models and are part of
state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems
required by the 1993 federal law.  The models are designed to identify
UI beneficiaries who are most likely to exhaust their benefit entitle-
ment, so that reemployment services can be delivered quickly and pro-
longed unemployment can be forestalled.
Since WPRS profiling models currently being used by the states
identify potentially dislocated workers, they offer a natural means for
targeting reemployment bonus offers.  This chapter summarizes recent
findings from simulation analysis using data from the Pennsylvania and
Washington experiments.  These experiments were financed with mon-
ey that Congress earmarked in 1987 to investigate methods for promot-
ing reemployment of workers dislocated from their jobs because of
structural change in the economy.  While the first evaluations found lit-
tle evidence that the reemployment bonus is an effective intervention
for dislocated workers, our simulation results suggest that targeting
reemployment bonus offers with state profiling models may apprecia-
bly improve the cost-effectiveness of the bonus.
The analysis of this chapter yields positive evidence consistent
with findings from targeting studies for other employment programs
that targeting services can increase reemployment success.  For exam-
ple, Corson and Decker (1996), who applied a similar simulation
analysis to the job search assistance intervention for dislocated workers
in the New Jersey experiment, estimated a significant improvement in
program effectiveness.
THE REEMPLOYMENT BONUS EXPERIMENT
The first reemployment bonus experiment was conducted in Illi-
nois during 1984–1985.  It found that a $500 reemployment bonus of-
fer to UI claimants for returning to work within 11 weeks (the qualifi-
cation period) and staying employed at least four months (the
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Table 6.1  Treatment Designs for the Reemployment Bonus Experiments
State
Bonus
amount ($) Qualification period (weeks)
Illinois 500 11
New Jersey Declininga 12
Pennsylvania 6








Declininga — Declininga, long
qualification
Washington (0.2 × potential UI
duration) + 1 week
(0.4 × potential UI
duration) + 1 week












a Declining means an initial bonus offer of half the remaining U.I. entitlement payable
for reemployment within two weeks and then declining by 10% per week.
12
reemployment requirement) reduced the duration of UI compensated
unemployment by 1.15 weeks and saved more than two dollars in UI
benefit payments for every dollar paid out in bonuses and administra-
tion of the bonus offer (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).  Treatment
designs for the four experiments are given in Table 6.1, and mean net
impact estimates are in Table 6.2.2
Encouraging results from the Illinois reemployment bonus experi-
ment led to replication trials in other states to test if the large effects
found in Illinois could be duplicated.  The other experiments varied the
bonus amount and the qualification period in an attempt to find the op-
timal bonus.
The reemployment bonus offer in the 1985–1986 New Jersey ex-
periment also had a four-month reemployment requirement, but it had a
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Table 6.2  Mean Net Impacts on Weeks and Dollars of UI in the
Benefit Year across Four Experiments
Experiment
Net impact on weeks 
of UI benefits
Net impact on dollars 
of UI benefits
Illinois –1.15** (0.29) –194** (47)
New Jersey –0.69** (0.23) –101** (45)
Pennsylvania –0.54** (0.21) –95** (37)
Washington –0.40** (0.21) –63** (33)
NOTE: The impact estimates reported in this table are based on the full analytic
samples examined in each experiment.  Eligibility conditions for these samples
are summarized in Table 6.3.  The remaining estimates in this chapter for Pennsyl-
vania and Washington are based on samples restricted by profiling considerations.
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
12-week qualification period and a bonus amount that decreased as the
duration of insured unemployment lengthened.  Net impacts on UI re-
ceipt in the New Jersey experiment were much smaller than in Illinois,
with the bonus offer yielding only a 0.69 week reduction in UI pay-
ments.  This raised questions about the appeal to the UI system of such
a bonus offer (Corson et al. 1989).
The states of Pennsylvania and Washington each conducted sepa-
rate reemployment bonus experiments in 1988–1989 involving a total
of 11 different treatments, as described in Table 6.1.  The Washington
experiment had a mean bonus offer of about 3.5 times the weekly ben-
efit amount (WBA) and a qualification period that averaged about 7.5
weeks long.  Pennsylvania paid either three or six times the WBA and
had qualification periods of either 6 or 12 weeks.  There was also a long
qualification period treatment with a declining bonus in Pennsylvania.
Some of the bonus offers in Pennsylvania and Washington were nearly
identical.  These were the short qualification/high bonus offer and long
qualification/high bonus offer treatments (Decker and O’Leary 1995, 
p. 536).  As a result, it was hoped that the evaluation findings from the
two experiments would be complementary and reinforcing.
The Pennsylvania and Washington treatments were intended to
supplement information provided by the Illinois experiment by identi-
fying which bonus amount and qualification period was most effective.
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Among the five treatments in Pennsylvania and six treatments in
Washington, only four were cost-effective from the perspective of the
UI system (Decker and O’Leary 1995).  As reported in Table 6.2, the
mean net impact of the five Pennsylvania treatments of –0.54 weeks 
of UI and the mean net impact of the six Washington treatments of
–0.41 weeks of UI were even more modest than the New Jersey re-
sults.
Other analyses have examined the individual experiments and their
relationship to one another.  The Illinois results were found to be
stronger than the other experiments because of the opportunity to re-
duce much longer potential durations of benefits since extended bene-
fits were available during roughly the first half of the operation of the
Illinois experiment (Davidson and Woodbury 1991; O’Leary, Spiegel-
man, and Kline 1995).  New Jersey impacts were found to be weaker
than those in Illinois because of the differences in the behavioral re-
sponses to fixed versus declining reemployment bonus offers (Decker
1994).  Slightly stronger results in Pennsylvania than Washington were
attributed to tighter labor markets in Pennsylvania than in Washington
during the operation of the two experiments (O’Leary, Spiegelman, and
Kline 1995).  Differences in impact estimates among the experiments
may be further reconciled by examining the alternative targeting of of-
fers resulting from the differing eligibility conditions among the exper-
iments.
It is important to note that each of the four experiments compared
reemployment earnings of those offered a reemployment bonus with
those in control groups not offered a bonus.  Despite spells of compen-
sated unemployment, which were shorter on average, reemployment
earnings were no lower for those offered a bonus.  Treatment and con-
trol reemployment earnings were virtually identical in all of the experi-
ments, suggesting that the offer of a reemployment bonus does not in-
duce job seekers to accept lower quality jobs as measured by the rate of
compensation.  Long-term follow-up evidence from the New Jersey ex-
periment is particularly compelling on this point.  Earnings were
tracked in each of six years immediately following the experiment, and
neither in any particular year nor cumulatively over the six-year period
was there a significant difference in earnings between those offered a
bonus and those in the control group (Corson and Haimson 1995, 
p. 36).3
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ELIGIBILITY FOR THE EXPERIMENTS
Previous analyses of the reemployment bonus experiments have
examined neither the effects of targeting bonus offers nor the effects of
differences in eligibility conditions.  In most analyses, the implicit tar-
geting resulting from eligibility criteria for the experiments has been
accepted as a contextual datum.  Each of the four experiments had
slightly different eligibility requirements for unemployed workers to
participate as members of treatment or control groups.  The experi-
ments were mainly focused on permanently separated employees who
were going to have difficulty finding new employment.  However, the
degree of sample screening varied; this was because of a conscious ef-
fort to coordinate designs to increase the information provided by the
collection of experiments.
Eligibility criteria for the four experiments separated into UI and
dislocated worker criteria are summarized in Table 6.3. The require-
ments were intended to assure that workers opened a UI benefit claim,
dealt with UI administrative rules, and experienced some degree of dis-
placement from work.
To elicit the maximum possible bonus impact, offers should be
made as soon as possible after a claim for UI benefits is opened.  The
offer was made after employment service (ES) registration in Illinois,
after a first UI payment in New Jersey, and after claiming a UI waiting
week in Pennsylvania.4 In the Washington experiment, the bonus offer
was made during the initial UI claim interview, which is well before re-
ceipt of the first benefit payment.  Furthermore, bonus payments in
Washington were sometimes made to persons who never even filed for
waiting-week credit.5 The other experiments required UI payment for
bonus payment eligibility.
The presence and extent of dislocated worker criteria varied great-
ly across the experiments.  Screening was extensive in New Jersey,
while it was nonexistent in Washington.  In terms of this design feature,
the Illinois and Pennsylvania experiments fell in between.  In Illinois,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, offers were aimed mainly at permanent-
ly separated unemployed workers.  Those awaiting recall and union hir-
ing hall members were either explicitly or indirectly excluded.  No such
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Table 6.3  Eligibility Criteria for the Reemployment Bonus Experiments
State UI eligibility criteria Dislocated worker criteria
Illinois Initial UI claims only Eligible for a full 26 weeks
of potential duration





At least age 20, not older
than 54
New Jersey First UI payments only Three years tenure on prior
job
Age 25 or older
Union hiring hall exclusion
Exclude temporary layoffs:
recall expected on a
specific date
Pennsylvania Initial UI claims only Union hiring hall exclusion
Regular UI claims 
Initially satisfied monetary 
eligibility conditions 
Not separated from job due to 
a labor dispute 
Signed for a waiting week or 
first payment within 6 
weeks of benefit 
application date
Exclude employer attached:
must not have a specific
recall date within 60 days
after benefit application
Washington Initial UI claims only 
Eligible to receive benefits 
from the state UI trust fund 
Monetarily valid claims at the 
time of filing
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exclusion was imposed in Washington, where the sample design pro-
vided that more restrictive screens could be imposed on the experimen-
tal data as part of the subgroup analysis.  Results from Washington in-
dicate that targeting offers to dislocated workers, defined as those with
three or more years of prior job tenure, would modestly increase treat-
ment effects.6 Additionally, requiring a waiting week in Washington
would probably have increased net impacts of the bonus offer.7
STATE PROFILING MODELS
In all states, profiling done as part of a WPRS system involves a
two-step process.  The first step excludes UI claimants expecting recall
by their previous employers and those who are members of full-referral
union hiring halls.  These exclusions are applied to focus services on
dislocated workers, and because such UI beneficiaries are not required
to actively seek reemployment on their own.  The second step identifies
those among the remaining group who are most likely to exhaust UI
benefits.  Almost all states perform the second profiling step using a sta-
tistical model that predicts the probability of benefit exhaustion.
The factors used to help predict exhaustion in state WPRS models
usually include education, job tenure, change in employment in the pri-
or industry and occupation, and the local unemployment rate.  Federal
civil rights law prohibits UI benefit eligibility screens based on age,
race, or gender, so these factors are excluded.  When workers open a
new claim for UI benefits, their personal and labor market characteris-
tics are used in a profiling equation to predict their individual probabil-
ity of UI benefit exhaustion.  State WPRS systems then quickly refer UI
claimants with a high probability of exhausting benefits to special
reemployment assistance (Wandner 1997).
As seen in Table 6.4, the profiling models in Pennsylvania and
Washington also include variables summarizing beneficiary UI entitle-
ment.  The profiling models in these two states have similar elements,
but the Washington model includes more variables in the education and
industry categories.8 Furthermore, because of the great differences in
Washington labor markets, three different models are used in that state.
Our simulation analysis was based only on the model for the Puget
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Job tenure 1 1
Industry 2 17
Local economic conditions 1 1
UI entitlement 2 2
a Variables for age, race, and gender are prohibited by federal civil rights law.
Sound area, which is home to more than half of the state’s profiled UI
claimants.
TARGETING THE BONUS OFFER
Bonus targeting simulations were performed using both the param-
eters in the actual Pennsylvania and Washington models set in 1994 and
new models for each state estimated on the control group data from the
experiments.9 The newly estimated models used similar methods and
prediction factors as the original state models.10 Results from the two
sets of models were broadly consistent.  In this chapter, we present only
results from the new models estimated on data gathered during the ex-
periments in Pennsylvania and Washington.
Predicted exhaustion probabilities were computed for UI claimants
in both the treatment and the control groups.  Cases were then sorted
from the highest to lowest exhaustion probability.  The net impacts of
the bonus offer were then computed for different groups defined by
deciles of the distribution of predicted exhaustion probabilities.  Alter-
native possible target groups were formed by gradually lowering the
exhaustion probability threshold.  Impact estimates were computed by
contrasting benefit receipt by treatment group members with control
group members in the same deciles of ex ante predicted probability of
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Table 6.5  Impacts of Combined Treatments on UI Benefit Dollars 

































































































Sample size 5,201 5,201 12,144 12,144
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  ** = Statistically significant at the 95 per-
cent confidence level in a two-tailed test; * = statistically significant at the 90 percent
confidence level in a two-tailed test.  
UI benefit exhaustion.  Estimates for both the incremental decile
groups and the cumulative samples were examined.
The estimates provided in Table 6.5 do not provide clear guidance
about which probability threshold generates the largest impacts.  Im-
pacts are relatively large when the offer is made to either the top 20 or
50 percent of the exhaustion probability distribution.  For the Pennsyl-
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vania experiment, the 10th, 9th, 7th, and 5th deciles have the largest es-
timated impacts.  For the Washington experiment, the 9th and 6th
deciles have the greatest estimated impacts.  In the Washington experi-
ment the lower five deciles all have smaller impacts, while for Pennsyl-
vania the lowest two deciles have substantial effects.  All of this sug-
gests that narrowly targeting a bonus offer to those most likely to
exhaust, may not be the best strategy to maximize the overall response.
Based on these findings, we choose to examine the effects of bonus of-
fers made to the top quarter and the top half of the exhaustion probabil-
ity distribution.
NET IMPACTS OF TARGETED BONUS OFFERS
Net impact estimates of all Pennsylvania and Washington treat-
ments on dollars of UI payments in the benefit year are reported in
Table 6.6 for the full sample, the top 50 percent most likely to exhaust
UI benefits, and the top 25 percent most likely to exhaust.  The results
suggest that targeting a reemployment bonus to claimants with high ex-
haustion probabilities can yield larger reductions in UI receipt than a
nontargeted bonus.  However, the use of a higher probability threshold
for targeting does not necessarily translate into larger UI reductions.
Among the 11 individual treatments in the two states, there is not a
consistent pattern of higher treatment impacts for samples above the
percentile cutoffs.  Targeting to either the top 25 percent or top 50 per-
cent of the distribution yields higher impacts in 9 of the 11 treatments
compared to a nontargeted bonus offer.  The common factor among the
treatments with higher impacts above the thresholds is that in most cas-
es they involve a long qualification period.
For the mean bonus offer in both experiments, impacts are larger
and statistically significant when the offer is made to the top 50 percent
of the exhaustion probability distribution.  Targeting to the top half of
the distribution raises the impact on UI benefit payments in the Penn-
sylvania experiment from –$115 to –$161, and in the Washington ex-
periment from –$30 to –$117.
Our findings suggest that targeting a reemployment bonus to
claimants with high predicted exhaustion probabilities can yield larger
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Table 6.6  Summary of Net Impacts on Benefit Year UI Payments 
($ per claimant)
Bonus amt. Qualif. period Top 25% Top 50% Full sample
Pennsylvania bonus offersa















































































NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  ** = Statistically significant at the 95
percent level of confidence in a two-tailed test; * = statistically significant at the 90 per-
cent level of confidence in a two-tailed test.  
a Pennsylvania bonus amount: low = 3 × WBA; high = 6 × WBA; declining = half the
remaining UI entitlement with the initial offer good for two weeks and then declining
by 10 percent per week.  Pennsylvania qualification period: short = 6 weeks, long =
12 weeks.
b Washington bonus amount: low = 2 × WBA; medium = 4 × WBA; high = 6 × WBA.
Washington qualification period: short = 0.2 × (potential UI duration) + 1 week; long
= 0.4 × (potential UI duration) + 1 week. 
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reductions in UI receipt than a nontargeted bonus.  However, targeting
does not guarantee larger reductions in benefit payments.  Furthermore,
the use of a higher probability threshold for targeting does not neces-
sarily translate into larger UI reductions.  In our estimates, the lower
threshold (top 50 percent) usually yields larger impacts for the targeted
group than the higher threshold (top 25 percent).  We also found that
the improved response associated with targeting follows more consis-
tently for bonus offers with a long rather than short qualification period.
NET BENEFITS
Net benefits are considered here from three distinct perspectives:
the UI system, government, and all of society.  The most narrow view of
net benefits considered is that of the UI system itself.  It is reasonable to
assume that in an actual bonus program, bonuses would be paid from the
UI trust fund.  Costs to the UI system are bonus payments and adminis-
trative costs, while benefits are the savings in UI payments to claimants
plus any increased UI tax revenue resulting from increased earnings.
A somewhat broader perspective for assessing net benefits is the
government taken as a whole.  Government represents the collection of
all public agencies that levy taxes and dispense public services.  Bene-
fits to government from a bonus program include the reduction in UI
compensation paid, and additional taxes generated as a result of in-
creased earnings.  The latter include income taxes, payroll taxes, and
taxes on employee earnings paid by employers.  Costs to the govern-
ment include the cost of administering the bonus offer program and
bonus payments.
The ultimate acceptability of a program depends on whether it gen-
erates positive net benefits to society as a whole.  Society gains from a
program if the aggregate value of output increases.  For a bonus pro-
gram, gains to society may be approximated by the increase in com-
pensation paid to claimants who respond to the bonus offer by obtain-
ing jobs more quickly.  Societal costs are simply the costs of
administering the program.11
Previous examinations of net benefits for reemployment bonus of-
fers found results to be increasingly favorable as the perspective was
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gradually broadened from the UI system itself, to the government, and
finally to society as a whole.  The bonus offers have generally not been
found to be cost-effective from the narrow perspective of the UI sys-
tem.  At best, a nontargeted bonus appears to be a break-even proposi-
tion for society as a whole (O’Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline 1995, pp.
264–267).
The estimates of administrative costs used in our net benefit com-
putations probably bound the range of costs that would be experienced
in an actual program.  The cost per offer in Pennsylvania was esti-
mated at $33, while the cost in Washington was put at $3.  The Penn-
sylvania estimate reflects the administrative cost of running the ex-
periment, while the Washington estimate was provided by the state
employment security agency as the likely cost per offer under an on-
going program.  Certain costs associated with running an experiment
would not be incurred in an operational program, and this largely ex-
plains the difference in the two estimates.  It is likely that the average
administrative cost of an ongoing program would lie between these ex-
tremes.
Based on the predicted probability of UI benefit exhaustion, Table
6.7 presents estimates from each of the three evaluation perspectives of
net benefits for bonus offers made to the top 25 percent, the top 50 per-
cent, and all of those for whom the model was estimated.  That is, union
hiring hall members and temporary layoffs awaiting job recall were ex-
cluded when making computations.12 Restricted sample sizes mean
that few of the parameters in Table 6.7 were estimated with statistical
precision; nonetheless, we proceed to discuss the observed patterns of
response to targeted bonus offers.
From the narrow perspective of the UI system, net benefit compu-
tations for the Pennsylvania experiment suggest that targeting the
bonus offers increases net benefits for all three long qualification period
treatments, but diminishes net benefits for treatments with a short qual-
ification period.  The improved net benefits for the long qualification
bonus offers were large enough to result in the overall mean response to
targeted bonus offers having positive point estimates for the Pennsylva-
nia experiment.  These results are driven mainly by the reduction in UI
benefit payments due to targeting, since the added bonus payment costs
from targeting were estimated to be modest in the Pennsylvania sam-
ple.
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For all government and society, targeting offers in the Pennsylvania
experiment improved net benefits for all treatments except the high
bonus/long qualification period offer.  The result for this treatment was
due to lower earnings observed for the targeted group.  In Pennsylvania
the high bonus/long qualification offer is the only treatment which sug-
gested that a bonus offer might induce reemployment in jobs inferior to
the prior one.13 In contrast, the low bonus/long qualification offer did
not have unfavorable impacts on earnings and resulted in very favor-
able net benefit estimates.
Evidence from the Washington experiment also suggests that tar-
geting to those most likely to exhaust UI benefits can improve the cost-
effectiveness of bonus offers.  However, the results for Washington are
not as pronounced as in the Pennsylvania data.  The higher bonus pay-
ment costs in the Washington experiment are the reason that treatments
with the higher bonus amounts fail to have positive net benefits for ei-
ther target group.
The most favorable treatment design and targeting plan to emerge
from our analysis combines a low bonus amount with a long qualifica-
tion period, targeted to the 50 percent most likely to exhaust UI bene-
fits: for example, a bonus amount set at three times the weekly benefit
amount, a qualification period 12 weeks long, and targeted to the half of
claimants most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement.  Our esti-
mates suggest that such a bonus offer would promote quicker return to
work and save the UI trust funds between $50 and $100 per offer.  The
net benefits to all government and to society should be significantly
greater.
CAVEATS
Targeting with profiling models improves the appeal of the reem-
ployment bonus program for employment policy.  However, two poten-
tial behavioral effects might reduce cost-effectiveness for an opera-
tional program.14 First, an actual bonus program could have a
displacement effect.  Displacement occurs if UI claimants who are of-
fered a bonus increase their rate of reemployment at the expense of oth-







Table 6.7  Net Benefits of the Bonus Offers above Alternative Percentile Cutoffs of Predicted UI Exhaustion
Probabilities ($ per claimant)
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Full 
sample Top 25% Top 50%
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NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** = Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test; * = sta-
tistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test.
a For the UI system, net benefits are UI benefit savings plus UI tax revenues on additional earnings minus the costs of bonus pay-
ments and program administration.  The current average UI tax rates on earnings are 1.00 percent in Pennsylvania and 1.15 percent
in Washington.
b For government, net benefits are UI benefit savings plus all added tax revenues due to added earnings (UI taxes, Federal Income
Contribution Act tax of 15.02 percent, federal income taxes assumed to be 15 percent, and state income taxes which are 2.80 per-
cent in Pennsylvania and zero in Washington) minus the costs of bonus payments and program administration.  
c For society as a whole, net benefits are simply additional earnings minus administrative costs since taxes and transfer payments
cancel from a societal perspective. 
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operational bonus offer program could induce an entry effect; that is,
the availability of a reemployment bonus might result in a larger pro-
portion of unemployed job seekers filing for UI, or entering the UI sys-
tem.
If entry and displacement effects are sizeable, actual program cost-
effectiveness will be lowered.  However, targeting offers to only those
most likely to exhaust UI should reduce both these risks.  Targeting
would introduce uncertainty that a bonus offer would be forthcoming
upon filing a UI claim, which should reduce the chance of a large en-
try effect.  Targeting should also lower any potential for displacement,
since a smaller proportion of claimants would receive the bonus of-
fer.15
CONCLUSION
Earlier research has indicated that a nontargeted reemployment
bonus program is not good public policy since it would not reliably
conserve UI trust fund reserves.  In this chapter, profiling models simi-
lar to those in state WPRS systems are used to reexamine evidence
from the Pennsylvania and Washington reemployment bonus experi-
ments.
Targeting offers with WPRS models to UI claimants identified as
most likely to exhaust benefits is estimated to increase cost-effective-
ness of the reemployment bonus.  The best candidate to emerge for a
targeted reemployment bonus is a low bonus amount, with a long qual-
ification period, targeted to the half of profiled claimants most likely to
exhaust their UI benefit entitlement.
A reemployment bonus targeted with WPRS models is an appeal-
ing policy option for a cost-effective early intervention to promote
reemployment.  It would be administratively simple to implement, it is
likely to be cost neutral to the UI program, and it may yield significant
positive net benefits to individuals and society.  Similar to other reem-
ployment initiatives examined in this volume, targeting services with
statistical models based on participant characteristics appears to be a
practical and cost-effective strategy.
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partment of Labor.  We accept responsibility for any errors.
1. In this chapter, a dislocated worker is someone with significant prior job attach-
ment who has lost his job and has little prospect of returning to it or to another job
in a similar occupation and industry.  This is consistent with the program eligibil-
ity definition in the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act
(EDWAA) of 1988, which amended Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act
(JTPA) of 1982, and provides funds to states and local substate grantees so they
can help dislocated workers find and qualify for new jobs.  The EDWAA defini-
tion includes workers who lose their jobs because of plant closures or mass lay-
offs; long-term unemployed persons with limited job opportunities in their fields;
and farmers, ranchers, and other self-employed persons who become unemployed
due to general economic conditions.  Leigh (1995) summarized the EDWAA.
2. Local public employment offices served as enrollment sites in each of the experi-
ments.  They were selected to achieve samples which were representative of UI
claimants in the state as a whole.  Sampling of claimants within each local office
was done by random assignment.  Sample sizes were set large enough to achieve
the precision needed for estimating individual and subgroup treatment impacts of
policy interest. 
3. O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (2001) reported that earnings outcomes were
more favorable for the targeted groups, but there was no significant impact.  How-
ever, groups in the bottom 75 and 50 percent of the exhaustion probability distri-
bution in the Washington experiment had statistically significant reductions in
earnings.  That is, the strongest observed tendency of the bonus to induce reem-
ployment in inferior jobs was exhibited by those below the targeting thresholds.
Targeting would minimize any tendency in this direction.
4. The waiting week is a period of noncompensable unemployment which must pre-
cede UI payments in a new benefit year.
5. Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992, p. 8) explained the eligibility arrange-
ment for people in the Washington experiment who started a new UI benefit year
but never claimed a waiting week or benefit.
6. Bonus impacts for UI claimants with three or more years of tenure in the Wash-
ington experiment were somewhat larger, but they were not statistically signifi-
cantly greater than impacts for the complementary group (Spiegelman, O’Leary,
and Kline 1992, pp. 116–119).
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7. Interpretation of this result is tentative because of the econometric problem that
estimation involves sample selection based on an endogenous variable (Spiegel-
man, O’Leary, and Kline 1992, p. 110).  However, the finding appears to be vali-
dated by results under ex ante eligibility screens applied in the other experiments.
8. Examples of WPRS profiling models from a number of states are given in Bal-
ducchi (1996).  Most states with statistical models have chosen to predict UI ex-
haustion using a logistic regression specification.
9. Both Pennsylvania and Washington use logistic regression models to predict UI
benefit exhaustion, since the variable that we are trying to predict is whether indi-
viduals exhaust their UI benefits or do not.
10. Details about the original state profiling models, the newly estimated models, and
all simulation results are given in O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (1998).
11. Details of the component estimates for the net benefit computations are provided
in O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (2001).
12. This is the first screen in the WPRS profiling system.  Union hiring hall members
and those awaiting recall had to be excluded from the Washington sample for
computations.  As seen in Table 6.2, such beneficiaries were not in the Pennsylva-
nia data at all since they were not given bonus offers.
13. This earnings result for the high bonus offer in Pennsylvania is consistent with the
interpretation by Nicholson (2001) of the reemployment bonus as a wage subsidy.
14. As suggested by Meyer (1995).
15. Davidson and Woodbury (1993) found that without targeting displacement could
be in the range of 30 to 60 percent, even though bonus offers induce quicker job
matches which generates more income growth and new job vacancies.  Targeting
could significantly reduce this risk.
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Comments on Chapter 6
Jennifer Warlick
University of Notre Dame
This chapter considers the desirability of using profiling to target
reemployment bonuses to those displaced workers expected to have the
most difficulty finding new employment and hence the longest spells of
unemployment.  It reports on simulations conducted by the authors that
utilize parameters estimated in experiments conducted in Washington
and Pennsylvania.  Their analysis is very interesting and first rate.
Moreover, the chapter is clearly and concisely written.  By limiting the
description of the technical aspects of the microsimulations, the authors
focus the reader’s attention on the policy issues at hand: can targeting
with profiling enhance the power of reemployment bonuses?  If so, how
is the target group best defined?  Which combination of sample selec-
tion and bonus eligibility criteria maximizes the impact of reemploy-
ment bonuses?
My primary impression is that this chapter is too short.  Indeed, my
comments focus more on what the authors do not say than on what they
do say.  The chapter left me wanting to know more; not more about the
experiments or the simulations themselves—I trust that there is little
improvement that could be made in the technical area.  Rather, I want
to know more about the unemployed workers who were treated by the
experiments and whether the bonuses were in their best interest.  I want
to know more about the motivations of the unemployed, how they ap-
proach the search for a new job, and what goes through their minds as
they decide whether to accept jobs that might be offered to them.  Do
they weigh short-run gains against long-run payoffs?  Does the
prospect of a reemployment bonus in a time when every penny counts
prompt them to choose a different job than they would have in its ab-
sence?  When a bonus is available, do they accept the first offer they re-
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ceive rather than continue the search for a job that might better match
their skills and could lead to greater long-run payoffs?  And if this is the
case, does the policy of reemployment bonuses promote the best inter-
ests of the unemployed?  Can the outcomes be labeled “reemployment
successes,” to borrow a term from the chapter, or is it in the best inter-
est of the UI program that the bonuses seek to promote?
The analysis of the net benefits of the reemployment bonuses fo-
cuses on entities other than the unemployed individual.  For example,
in the section entitled “Net Benefits,” the authors state:
Previous examinations of net benefits for reemployment bonus of-
fers found more favorable results as the perspective broadened
from the UI system, to all government, to society as a whole.  The
net benefits to the UI system of a reemployment bonus offer are
the reduction in UI benefit payments, minus the cost of bonus pay-
ments, minus any additional costs that result from administering a
reemployment bonus.
If the best interests of the individual were the primary focus, I suspect
that the net benefits would be the difference in the discounted flow of
future earnings between the treatment and control groups.  This mea-
sure would take into account both differences in wage and salary levels
and the expected tenure on the jobs.  Yes, I worry that the bonuses
could affect not only the type of job accepted but also the length of em-
ployment on that job. 
It may be that it isn’t possible to calculate this measure with the
data from the Washington and Pennsylvania experiments.  From the de-
scription in the chapter I could not tell whether and how long the ex-
periments followed the unemployed after they returned to work.  If
these are not available, it is understandable that the potential effects of
bonuses on earnings and job duration are not investigated empirically
here.
It has also occurred to me that the effects of the bonuses on worker
well-being lie beyond the scope of this chapter but are addressed in oth-
er chapters of this volume.  My comments may reflect the fact that I
read only one-tenth of the total manuscript.  If I had read the whole
manuscript, would my questions be answered?
Similarly, would I have bothered to raise these questions if I were
more familiar with this literature?  Experts in this area may be able to
tell me that other studies not included in this volume have examined
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my questions and demonstrated that bonuses do not affect job search,
job choice, or job tenure.  Does the fact that bonuses are targeted at the
unemployed workers most likely to exhaust benefits suggest a different
sort of mental calculus?  How do these workers see their choices?  Is
the decision rule I suggested above—that of weighing the short-run
gains of accepting a “bird in the hand” plus bonus versus the long-run
payoffs of continued search for a better placement—inappropriate for
them?  Or might you tell me that the rules of UI programs eliminate this
issue by requiring that UI beneficiaries accept the first job offer they re-
ceive.  I hope not, because that too would seem a shortsighted policy.
If the issues I have raised are not answered elsewhere in this vol-
ume or are not common knowledge among the audience targeted as
readers of this book, then I urge the authors to acknowledge this line of
questioning.  Perhaps this could be done in the Caveats section, or
maybe at an earlier point in the chapter in a discussion of the meaning
of “reemployment success.”  Only then could I agree with their conclu-
sion that “a reemployment bonus targeted with WPRS models is an ap-
pealing policy option for a cost-effective early intervention to promote
reemployment.  It . . . may yield significant positive net benefits to indi-
viduals and society.”
In the absence of such a discussion, I am left with a lingering im-
pression that the reemployment bonuses share with welfare reform an
emphasis on reducing expenditures even if it means sacrificing the
well-being of the targeted group.  My understanding of the UI system is
that it was designed to give unemployed workers an opportunity to
search not only for a job, but also for a job that was right for them.  In
contrast, a system of bonuses that encourages UI beneficiaries to rush
through the search process seems to have cost savings as its goal.  If
this emphasis on cost saving is not the message that the authors want to
send, I think it would be prudent for them to give equal time to the best
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